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Mitigation and 
compensation can 
overcome the NIMBY 
syndrome of public 







ot long ago> industry Nproposed si[es for po· tencially ha,ardous fa. cilities. the goverrlmenc approved them, and 
most people acce;)[ed che decision. 
Today, people are not wil ling co 
tolerate health and safety risks 
from wasce facilities. They are con-
cerned about the noise and traffic 
disruptions inherent co hosting a 
site, and generally I no community 
is willing co incur a disproporrion· 
ace bucden posed by hazardous fa. 
cilicies. The acronym NIMBY is pare 
of the language. Opposition co sir-
ing chese facilities is as widespread 
as ic is problematic. 
Incentives to potential host com .. 
municies can calm che current ad-
versarial situation. Developers and 
government agencies need to un-
derstand new ways co deal with 
chis d ramatic change in public at· 
ticudes and with che incense public 
scruriny of proposed facili ties thac 
produce, use or score hazardous 
materials. 
Costs, benefits and risks are the 
three outcomes important in sicing 
negotiations; mitigation and com~ 
pensation are the prin:i-ary inccn· 
tives that can be used by negotia-
tors. Mitigation incentives include 
changes in facility design and 
monitoring practic.es. T heir focus is 
on questions of physical or per, 
ceived risk. Compensation mea-
sures emphasize cosr,sharing and 
the redistribution of gains, which 
focus on equity and fairness. 
At most hazardous facilicv sites, 
a dispropocrionace sha re ·of the 
risks accrue to nearby residents or 
along key transportation routes, 
while benefits are shared by waste 
producers and produce users. Risks 
and benefits vary, depending on 
che specific community, the social 
and historical contex t within 
which the siting occurs, and che 
cype of planned facility. They also 
vary with changes in perspective, 
for example, whether impacts are 
seen as short, or long~term and 
whether a local, regional or na-
tional point of view is taken . These 
factors can be crirical co commu, 
nicy response. 
Sometimes trade-offs and im-
paces are rcJacively easy co iden, 
tify. For example, new jobs a t a fa. 
cil ity may offset an increase in 
traffic congestion. Assessing ocher 
outcomes may prove more diffi. 
cult . For example, a proposal co 
const ruct a srorage faciliry for 
chemicai wastes may increase anx-
iety about possible ground-water 
contaminadon or about long-term 
changes in the image of the com, 
municy. This anxiety may result in 
psychological distress, which is 
hacd co quantify . It's difficult co 
decide whether an impact merics 
mitigation or compensation when 
one cannot define its magnitude or 
when ics existence hinges on fu. 
cure events. 
PERCEIVED RISK 
There is a distincrion between 
cechnical measures of risk, as pre· 
dieted by experts> and perceived 
measures of risk, as experienced by 
laypeople. Experts typically think 
about facility risks in terms of im· 
pacts on human health and che 
nacural environmenra1 as mea-
sured by mortality and morbidity 
statistics. T hese concerns are im-
portant co the public, but so are a 
number of additional faccors: the 
anxiety or dread of having the fa. 
cility in one's "backyard''; patent 
decreas<'s in property values; possi-
bility of a catastrophic accident; 
the exrenc co which exoosure is 
voluntary; and the familiarity of 
the risk source. 
A risk as seen by the public may 
include dimensions not considered 
relevant by scientific experts. As-
su rances abou c p)ant safety in 
terms of probabiliry and severiry of 
likely accidents may fail co address 
public concerns. People may not 
only be worried about the number 
of fatalities from a possible acci-
dent but also about how these 
deachs occur, their geographic in-
cidence oc their latency period. [f 
people believe an accident could 
occur I they may focus on its caca-
mophic consequences. Being cold 
that the associated ;,robabi li ty is 
sraciscically low may do little to re-
duce fears. 
The public's idea of risk encom-
passes both che consequences of 
hosting a facility and the accual 
siting process. The cone of negoti· 
ations can establish a community's 
level of trust and confide nce in 
mar1agemem. How options are de .. 
fined and how power is shared be· 
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cween concerned parties may prove 
as important as the facility's ex· 
pected physical impacts. For ex• 
ample, Oeparcment of Energy ne· 
gotiators openly shared informa· 
tion and worked closely with Oak 
Ridge, Tenn. , citizens in discus .. 
sions of a temporary storage site 
for nuclear wastes. Togecher, chey 
developed a mutually satisfactory 
plan designed to counteract the 
adverse social and economic im, 
paces of nuclear-related scigma. 
CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES 
In any siting controversy, there 
are multiple experts and mulciple 
t V 
publics who may agree or disagree 
with each other. Such disagree-
ment may heighten fears. For new 
technologies there are often no sci, 
entific bases for reconciling these 
differences, because there is no 
empirical database and there is 
limited scientific evidence about 
che causes of an accident. 
Each of che public groups often 
will view a siting problem from 
their own perspective. Environ1 
mental groups typically focus on 
the potential consequences of a fa. 
cilicy co the surrounding area. In-
dustrial interests may give special 
attention to economic conse 1 
quences and to potential risks to 
human health. lt's also important 
to distinguish bctwe<:n public dis, 
agree.mcnts based on what parries 
consider important and ex:perr dis--
agreements about the nature of the 
risks. A first step coward a siting 
resolution is to identify these dif-
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ferent groups and to clarify the 
source of their disagreements. 
All parties to a negotiation must 
understand that there are costs 35 .. 
sociated with refu'Sing a proposed 
facility. Maintaining the status quo 
may email significant costs, stem, 
ming from unsafe exposure levels 
to hazardous materials or from 
rapidly escalating fees for waste 
disposal. The defaulc option-what 
is likely to happen if agreement is 
not reached-must be clearly 
stated. 
A decision to oppose the siting 
of a new waste·storage facility does 
not mean that health risks or fi. 
nancial payments will remain sea, 
ble. The dynamic nature of costs 
and risks may reveal additional 
consequences of maintaining the 
status quo and open the commu, 
niry to new ideas. The initial point 
of reference for negotiations and 
expeccarions for the furure is espe1 
cially important. Local officials are 
far more likely co recommend a 
significant change if they percel\·e 
the risks of che present situation co 
be serious and are convinced that 
the new facility will ameliorate the 
situation. 
What counrs is nor just the risks 
to a community from a specific 
proposed facility but the magni-
tude of the risks faced by commu· 
nicy residents from all sources. 
Thus, discussions about the health 
risks of a proposed ha,ardous facil-
ity may increase the salience of 
other risks and lead to concerns 
that these ocher risk sources also 
be mitigated. For example, selec-
tion of the Hanford Reservation in 
Washington as a candidate for 
storage of high-level nuclear wastes 
increased local concern about stor# 
age procedures for existing radio, 
active wastes. 
USING INCENTIVES 
A community, or any group with 
a srake in the decision, has to 
judge the net positive bcnefics of a 
facility by looking at che default 
option and at the incentives of, 
fered if siting is permitted. Miciga .. 
don and compensation arc positive 
tools in this process. 
Mitigation measures emphasiic 
reductions in potential risks. Com-
pensarion measures emphasize re· 
distribution between predicted 
winners and losers. The two incen, 
tive cypes are often complemen .. 
cary. For example, until a thresh-
old level of safety is reached 
through mitigation 1 discussions 
about compensation may be 
viewed as unethical, and any offer 
of compensation will be unaccept, 
able. Furthermore, what a devel, 
oper may see as a minor project 
may be viewed by a community as 
a threat co its established way of 
life. Even potential benefits to the 
community may be viewed as 
threacs. The promise of higher in-
comes and new jobs, for example, 
may seem a mixed blessing because 
it represents change from the fa# 
miliar and safe srarus quo. 
Both mitigation and compensa~ 
tion can be used in a variety of 
forms, and careful matching be· 
tween a specific siting situation 
and an incentives strategy is a pre· 
requisite for facility acceptance. 
Parties need to recognize that t,vo 
sets of concerns are paramount: is· 
sues of risk, primarily addressed 
through mitigation measures, and 
issues of equity or crust, primarily 
addressed through compensation. 
There are two basic forms of 
mitigation. Engineering measures, 
commonly used on many la rge· 
scale public projects, are based on 
physical pdnciples and reflect well-
defined probabilities based on the 
past performance of similar sys-
tems. Examples include placing 
materials in underground storage 
tanks and installing double liners 
or day membranes around wastes. 
Insrirurional mitigation measures 
place constraints on facility opera· 
tion. sometimes by directly cm-
powering local citizens to partici-
pate in those operations. Examples 
include imposing fines for acciden-
tal releases, enforcing standards 
th rough monitoring and control 
procedures, or establishi ng local 
representation on a facility's. gov .. 
eming board. 
There are six basic forms of 
compensation: 
• Direct monetary payment. This 
approach is widely used . However, 
individuals may refuse an offer of 
money because they view the pay .. 
menc as a bribe or as a poor sub-
stitute for loss of health or peace of 
mind. 
• In-kind awards. These include 
replacing impacted resources, for 
example building fish hatcheries co 
replace lost stock. 
• Contingency fonds. These set 
aside funds co assure chat a fadlicy 
INDIVIDUALS MAY 
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POOR SUBSTITUTE 
FOR HEAL TH LOSS. 
will meet its future financial obJi .. 
garions if an accident occurs. 
• Property value guarantees. This 
form of compensation protects 
homeowners and landowners by 
tying future price changes in che 
vicinity of a facility to those of a 
larger region. For example, Kodak 
has developed a plan ro guarantee 
propercy values of 200 homes near 
an industrial complex in Roches.-
ter, N .Y., over the next 10 years. 
• Benefit assurances. These typi· 
cally guarantee employment op, 
portunicies for community mem.-
bers or tie contracts for services 
and materials to local suppliers. 
• Economic goodwill incentives. 
This form of compensacion in .. 
eludes general nonproject expendi, 
cures , such as conrribucions to 
charities. These may prove attrac-
tive, particularly in cases where Jo,, 
cal opposition to che siting of a fa .. 
cilicy is high. 
In addition co direct impacts, in .. 
centives can have im{X)rtant indi· 
rect effects. Providing funds for 
better educational facilit ies could 
attract more individuals and busi .. 
nesses co an area, and modifying 
income dist ributions within a 
community has important social 
and economic imolications. An-
ocher indirect imPacc is che psy· 
chological reaction when a devel· 
oper is unwilling co provide a con.-
tingency fund. This can stimulate 
fears chat an accident is more likely 
than official statements suggest. 
Compensation payments often 
ex;,licidy recogni;e this potential 
for indirect benefits. In France, for 
example, communities within 50 
km of a nuclear power plant used 
co be given IO% reductions in eJcc-
uicicy rares co stimulate commu· 
nity growth (the ;,ractice has been 
stopped, reilecting a decision of the 
French government chat nuclear 
facilities arc as safe as other power· 
gene,ating plants). Here in the 
U.S., the Massachusetts Water Re-
sources Authority promised S24 
million in grant money and a job 
access and job training program co 
the town of Winthrop for permis-
sion co sire a se\i,;age treatment fa. 
cility nearby. 
TONE ANO TIMING 
Timing of incentives can be crit· 
ical. Different forms of compensa-
don can be provided \vhen a facil-
ity is bebg built, while it is oper· 
acing smoothly or after an 
accident. Each option signals a dif .. 
ferenr intent on the developer's 
part and satisfies a different need 
of the hosr community. for exam-
ple, compensation during planning 
directly addresses the perceived 
fairness of ,he siting process. This 
is usually important when the host 
communit)' sees other areas as 
benefiting from siring the facility in 
11someone else•s backyard. 11 
The procedures followed in sit· 
ing negotiations arc important in 
their own right. T hree factors are 
often critical. The first is rrusr, an 
clement difficult to define and 
normally an issue when it is ab-
sent. There is a technical aspect co 
developing cruse, based on a clear 
and comprehensive statement of 
the potential .risks and uncertain-
tie-s associated with building a nd 
operating the facility to be sited. 
Acceprable monitoring and decec.-
tion procedures help develop trust. 
Other less quantifiable factors 
might include developer coopera· 
tion in allowing public scrutiny of 
analyses and operations, the Op· 
portunities afforded local represen• 
tatives to take part in decision 
making, and rhe willingness of fa. 
cil ity operators to repo rt un· 
planned emissions and ocher such 
incidents. 
A second important procedural 
issue is whether one can achieve 
"efficiency," meaning that stake .. 
holders should be at least as well-
off after a facility is locared as they 
were before. However I it is difficult 
to decide which types of compen• 
sation are promoted, how close!)' 
losses and gains should be watched 
and what constitutes a legitimate 
claim for compensation. One ex-
ample of a difficult efficiency con-
sideration is distance from a site. 
[e's not clear what rules should 
guide claims for facilicy•relared in• 
juries posed bv proximity to a site 
or how co establish geographic 
bounds on the source or legitimacy 
of these claims. 
Equity is another procedural foc-
cor with several dimensions: be· 
tween locations, between genera.-
tions and between stakeholders. 
One good test for equity is whether 
the key stakeholders in a siting dis-
pute agree during planning srages 
of a facility co accept the decision· 
making process without knO\ving 
its outcome and maintain that 
agreement after sire selecrion and 
facility design. The Southeast 
Compact, in which eight states 
have joined co site a low-level r~ 
dioactive waste repository based on 
the group's weighting of IO techni· 
cal criteria, represents an experi-
ment siting consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The promise of a decrease in so-
cietal risks by siting new facilities 
should lead to exploring reduc• 
tions in local risks through rniciga· 
tion initiatives. The offset of com-
pensation can redistribute benefits 
experienced by owners back to the 
host community. lf all parties pay 
attention to procedural concerns. 
such as equity and trust, and to 
the important link between proce-
dures and outcomes, then the pos-
sibility of community acceptance 
of a hazardous facili ry can be sub-
stantially increased. Q 
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